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The Impact of Monetary Policy on Volatility of Equity Returns 





This study provides evidence for a positive relationship between an unexpected monetary 
policy shock and volatility of equity returns. It also finds a link between the former and possible 
transmission mechanisms: Dividend Yield, Discount Rate, and Leverage. It combines the dynamic 
analysis allowed by the VARX framework suggested by Gospodinov and Jamali (2015), while 
obtaining the monetary shocks from the instrumental VAR with HFI estimated by Gertler and 
Karadi (2015), that grant exogeneity and accounts for shocks to Forward Guidance. It also shows 
how results may change drastically when using a traditional shock measurement, especially when 










During the Great Recession, the financial markets have experienced an unprecedented 
turmoil. Amongst other phenomena, realized volatility of equity returns1 raised into levels never 
registered before. In response to the crisis, monetary agents entered in an era of unconventional 
monetary policy (MP), leading their traditional instrument, the Federal Funds Rate (FFR), to zero 
and resorting to communication and large-scale asset purchasing programs. But have monetary 
policy agents the ability to affect market volatility? And if so, through which mechanisms is the 
effect transmitted? Is there a difference before and after the Great Recession?  
Gospodinov and Jamali (2015) (GJ hereafter) have already asked the same questions. Their 
study uses a monthly VARX framework with data comprised between 1990 and 2008. They defined 
the shocks as the unexpected shift on MP, gauging the market expectation through the implied rate 
on the 30-day Federal Funds Rate Futures and compared it with the actual average Federal Funds 
Target Rate (FFTR) at the future’s maturity. They have noted that, an unexpected MP hawkish 
shock caused an increase in volatility, essentially transmitted by the persistent effect on the 
Dividend Yield. In their conclusions it was suggested that, after 2008, the gap between the expected 
and the actual target interest rate was to be close to zero, which would diminish the effect of MP 
on volatility. Their reasoning was as follows: since monetary agents started heavily relying on 
communication to increase transparency, the predictive capability of market agents was 
consequently improved, which makes surprises less likely to occur. This communication is referred 
by the authors as Forward Guidance.  
So, to test the ability of monetary agents to influence market volatility, a correct 
measurement of a MP shock is needed. Indeed, the literature has found evidence for the importance 
                                                          
1 For the sake of simplicity, market volatility or simply volatility will always refer to volatility of equity returns 
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of unexpected shocks as opposed to expected ones. (e.g. Bomfim, 2003 ; Bernanke and Kuttner, 
2004). Besides that, two main problems occur with the MP shock series construction proposed by 
GJ. The first is that the FFTR was discontinued in 2008, which makes expanding the sample 
potentially troublesome. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the change in the FFTR is 
completely exogenous2. The second problem is concerned with the definition and measurement of 
Forward Guidance. Indeed, communication may help market participants to make a better 
assessment of monetary agents’ future actions, but this is only one of the applications of Forward 
Guidance. Communication can shift the expected path of future short-term interest rate. Through 
this, monetary agents can influence a diverse number of asset prices, even if the FFR is virtually 
zero. So much so that Swanson and Williams (2012) and Wu (2016) showed that the yields of fixed 
income assets continued extremely responsive to MP after 2008, unbounded by the apparent zero 
lower bound. 
Hence, a correct measurement of a MP shock should 1) measure unexpected shocks, 2) 
account for effects of unconventional actions and 3) be exogenous to the model. We find that the 
High Frequency Identification (HFI) literature fulfills these requirements. This method also gauges 
market expectations using short-term interest rate futures3, and measures their variation in a tight 
window around a significant monetary event (usually 30 to 60 minutes), most commonly the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statement release. Since expectations are gauged using 
futures, 1) is guaranteed. If the futures used are expiring in any month other than the current one, 
it captures consensus on longer term interest rates, granting 2). Finally, the tight window restriction 
makes it extremely unlikely for expectations to be reacting to any type of non-monetary news, or 
for monetary agents to be reacting to the economy, avoiding simultaneity and omitted variable bias, 
                                                          
2 monetary agents could, for example, be reacting to information present in the model 
3 such as the 30-day Fed Funds Rate or Eurodollar Futures 
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which circumvents endogeneity (3)). 
This thesis aims to build upon the work of GJ by including a MP series that accounts for 
the most recent developments in the literature, while still providing clear evidence to the possible 
misleading results that could be taken otherwise. For this, we use GJ’s VARX framework and 
compare the results using two different series as MP measurement. The first one is similar to the 
original, but instead of using the discontinued FFTR series, uses the Effective Fed Funds Rate 
(EFFR). Granted, it will potentially increase endogeneity as the EFFR is not completely controlled 
by the Fed, thus making it exposed to other non-monetary factors, such as risk-aversion changes. 
But one can also argue that the Fed might stray from the stated Target Rate in times of need, which 
is reflected in the EFFR. Nonetheless, the usage of this series is exactly to show how misleading 
the results might be if the MP estimation method is flawed. The rest of the paper will refer this 
series as FEDS. The second one extracts the series from the 6-variable instrumental VAR with 
High Frequency Identification (HFI), developed by Gertler and Karadi (2015) that comprises the 
period between 1991m1 and 2012m6. 
Our results have shown that prior to the financial crisis, both estimation methods yielded 
similar results, whereas taking the full sample into consideration, everything changes. When using 
the FEDS series, the Dividend Yield effect has disappeared, but more surprisingly the effect of a 
hawkish shock translated into a decrease on volatility, contradicting the results of GJ. But if one 
would use the HFI series, the predictions would become much closer to the original. This shows 
that in times of unconventional policy, unconventional measurement tools are necessary and that 
monetary agents still have influence over market volatility. 
The rest of the assignment will be divided into 5 parts. The second section will review the 
most recent literature linking monetary policy and market volatility, discussing possible 
transmission mechanisms as in Gospodinov and Jamali (2015). In the third section, several 
6 
 
monetary policy identification methods will be reviewed. The fourth part will display the 
methodology and the data included in the model. The fifth section will present the results and 
discussion. The final part will give the main takeaways. 
2. Equity Market Volatility 
2.1. Linking Monetary Policy and Market Volatility 
The financial markets for equities have for a long time played a relevant role in the monetary 
policy literature. Several empirical works have found that an unexpected policy tightening results 
on lower excess equity returns (see for example Thorbeke, 1997 ; Bernanke and Kutner, 2004)). 
The latter have tried to explain this relationship by measuring the shocks on the real interest 
rate, on expected returns and on dividends. They have surprisingly found that real interest rates 
were not playing a significant role. They suggested that this effect could be attributed to the direct 
increased risk of the firm, that given an interest rate hike would see its balance sheet deteriorate. A 
second reason provided was related to the investor’s increased unwillingness to hold risk due to 
possible future higher inflation or decreased level of consumption, signaled by an interest rate hike. 
Therefore, investors will demand higher returns (premium), decreasing current stocks’ prices. 
These two possible explanations may bridge shocks in monetary policy and the two major 
theories that seek to explain the well-known negative relationship between stock returns and future 
volatility: The Leverage Effect and the Volatility Feedback Hypothesis. 
Introduced by Black (1976) and Christie (1982), the Leverage Effect states that a decrease 
of a firm’s stock price will lead to a higher leverage ratio. Like the first explanation provided by 
Bernanke and Kutner (2004), this deterioration of the firm’s financial situation will lead to an 
increased business riskiness which would eventually translate into price volatility in the future.  
The second main theory reverts the causality of the effect. If the Leverage Effect postulates 
that the decrease in returns translates into an increased future expected volatility, in the Volatility 
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Feedback Hypothesis (Campbell and Hentschel, 1992) is the expected future volatility that 
translates into the current stock returns. If future volatility is expected to be higher, investors will 
find themselves with riskier assets in hands, demanding increased future returns. For this to happen, 
current prices should decrease. This theory assumes that investors demand a premium for risk, that 
future volatility is indeed priced, and this compensation changes overtime. Furthermore, Campbell 
and Hentschel (1992) have also postulated that news can also increase volatility. According to their 
findings, big news will always have more (smaller) news associated to them in the future. 
Similar to Bernanke and Kutner (2004), GJ have also considered the Dividends and the 
Discount Rate as possible transmission mechanism. They state that an unexpected tightening will 
increase the Discount Rate, which will make Future Cash Flows (Dividends) more uncertain. 
2.2. Previous Work 
Asset volatility has been used for the most diverse purposes, including asset pricing and 
risk management. It is no surprise that links between monetary policy and volatility have been often 
studied in the literature. The most common procedures in the literature consist in using Garch-type 
models at a daily or even intraday level. Some examples follow below. 
Using an exponential Garch (EGarch) and gauging market expectations through survey 
methods, Lobo (2002) has discovered that volatility increases in the day of the announcement of 
an unexpected rate change, but quickly reverts to pre-announcement levels at the following day. 
He also found an asymmetric relationship between news and volatility, more specifically, 
unexpected interest rate hikes (bad news) yield increased volatility. 
Bomfim (2003) has used a Garch(1,1) to test whether the calm-before-the storm effect exists 
and the impact of the decision itself on market volatility. He uses future-based measures to extract 
market participants expectations, being able to measure the surprise by comparing it to the 
announced target rate. He found evidence that after 1994, the days prior to the FOMC 
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announcement present abnormally low volatility, whereas the day itself presents higher volatility. 
He also noted that unexpected changes in interest rates have a substantial impact on the FOMC day 
and produce an asymmetric effect. Using a High Frequency Identification method, Farka (2009) 
found similar results at an intraday level, as well as asymmetries, such as interest rate hikes having 
a higher impact on volatility than eases, higher impact on volatility when the economy is facing an 
economic slowdown and stating that path shocks dominate timing ones. 
Even if extremely useful to test some short-term relationships, Garch-type approaches lack 
the capability to study the persistence of the impact and which mechanisms transmit the shock. The 
work of Gospodinov and Jamali (2015) provides a plausible solution by using a monthly VARX 
framework. They have studied the reaction of excess returns and volatility as well as possible 
transmission channels (Dividend Yield, Leverage, Volatility Feedback, Discount rates and 
Volume4) to a contractionary policy shock (which was considered the exogenous variable). They 
have gauged market expectations by using the one-month ahead implied 30-days Federal Funds 
Rate futures at the last day of the month and comparing it with the average of the FFTR in the 
following month. The difference is considered as the unexpected shock. The time sample used was 
between 1990m1 and 2008m12. Their conclusions will be further discussed ahead. 
3. Measuring Monetary Policy Shocks 
3.1.Theoretical Background 
The first step to measure a monetary policy shock is its definition. To avoid spurious results, 
it should be noticed that not only other economic variables react to monetary policy actions, but 
also the other way around. This simultaneity can severely bias the results. Following Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), this endogenous reaction is called the Feedback Rule (or reaction 
                                                          
4 Also known as News Channel 
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function) and the difference between it and the policy indicator is the exogenous shock: 
 𝑌𝑡






 is a monetary policy indicator, 𝑓(Ω) is the reaction function to a set of variables 
Ω and 𝜀𝑡
𝑝
 is the exogenous shock. The key is therefore to estimate either 𝑓(Ω) or 𝜀𝑡
𝑝
 directly. 
Even though it is a relatively simple concept, its empirical application may be particularly 
troublesome. First, finding a pure policy indicator may turn out to be an arduous task. As already 
noted, if one would consider the FFR as an indicator, he would fail to measure effects of Forward 
Guidance. Furthermore, the FFR is set between banks, and not directly controlled by the Fed, which 
means that part of its variation can be attributed to non-monetary factors, such as term premiums 
variations. Using assets with longer maturities will only increase the reactions to other types of 
non-monetary news. Still related with the indicator selection, identifying all the news to which 
monetary policy is reacting may also be close to impossible. If there is a given event or variable 
that causes a reaction of monetary agents and other variables included in the model, then it is certain 
that an omitted variable bias exists. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004) consider employment 
releases to be a good example of this. 
The second set of problems relates with foresight. Ever since the Lucas Critique, 
expectations have plaid a huge roll in the literature. According to Ramey in his chapter in Taylor 
and Uhlig (2016), both the Fed and the market participants move according to their expectations 
about the future, using all the available information at the time. The same author notes that the Fed 
is known to use a huge amount of information5 that may be very difficult to quantify. Not 
accounting for that may consequently bias the results6. As the previous example, by incorrectly 
                                                          
5 Some of it may even be private 




measuring the reaction of monetary policy to GDP, the relationship becomes spurious. Finally, 
market participants also form their expectations about the future using all the available information 
to do so. This said, asset prices already reflect those expectations, which means that they will only 
react if those expectations are not met. Therefore, an interest rate move by the Fed may not cause 
asset prices to react if it is anticipated whereas leaving the rates unchanged may cause a reaction if 
it is not anticipated. 
Concluding, a correct measurement of monetary policy should separate what is a 
simultaneous response of monetary agents and economic variables as well as accounting for 
omitted variables in the data. It is also important to choose a policy indicator that correctly captures 
Forward Guidance and finds the share of its variation that is related with monetary actions only 
and with no other types of news. Finally, this reaction should reflect a shock to expectations and 
account for possible asymmetric information between agents. 
3.2. Empirical Work 
Due to its importance, the literature about monetary policy measurement is vast.  As hinted 
before, to estimate a monetary policy shock it is necessary to estimate 𝑓(Ω), 𝜀𝑡
𝑝
, or even both 
simultaneously. One of the most straightforward methods is to assume a rule for 𝑓(Ω), such a 
Taylor-type rule. Another popular econometrical framework used is the SVAR approach, with 
different kinds of identification strategies (see for instance Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 
1999; Romer and Romer, 2004; Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz, 2005) . By including 𝑌𝑡
𝑝
 in a system 
with other variables, the traditional SVAR approach assumes that 𝑓(Ω) can be estimated using the 
lags of all the variables present in the model and some contemporaneous restrictions, usually 
recursive as in  Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999). This can be problematic not only since 
the Fed may be using information not contained in the lags of the variables included in the model, 
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but also contemporaneous restrictions may be implausible in some situations where price stickiness 
does not exist, such as in financial variables. 
Some have suggested a solution to these problems7. Unfortunately, the most common 
methods usually use a recursive identification strategy, which is not plausible when financial 
variables are present.  
Gertler and Karadi (2015) combine High Frequency and VAR literature. Following the HFI 
literature (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2004; Gurkaynak et al., 2004; Gertler and Karadi, 2015), the 
authors use implied rates on short-term interest rate futures to gauge market expectations. This 
method argues that short-term interest rate futures efficiently reflect both the expectations on future 
path of short-term interest rates and a risk premium. Thus, price changes are either a consequence 
of revisions of the future rate path or risk premium changes. The objective is to isolate the portion 
of the price change that is caused by a monetary event. The method proposed by the HFI literature 
is to restrict the change’s measurement around a relevant monetary event in a tight window (usually 
30 to 60 minutes) after an FOMC announcement. Intuitively, this narrow period makes highly 
unlikely for markets to be reacting to other news or risk premium granting exogeneity (Gertler and 
Karadi, 2015). 
If the HFI literature usually considers this variation as a pure measurement of the shock 
itself, Gertler and Karadi (2015) differ by considering that they are only correlated with the shock 
itself (𝜀𝑡
𝑝) and nothing else, making it a valid instrument in a VAR framework. They then proceed 
to choose a policy indicator (𝑌𝑡
𝑝), usually the 1 or 2-year T-Bond yield, and use this High Frequency 
estimates to measure how much of the variation of the prior is explained by the unexpected shock. 
                                                          
7 For instance, Romer and Romer (2004) included a series which accounted for Fed’s intention in each action as well 
as the forecasts provided in the FOMC report, also known as Greenbook Forecasts. Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz 
(2005) have augmented the typical VAR using Dynamic Factor Analysis, increasing the amount of information used 
in a VAR while still avoiding the dimensionality curse 
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In this way, they can attribute part of the residual variation of 𝑌𝑡
𝑝
 due to unexpected shocks, yielding 
a true quantification of 𝜀𝑡
𝑝
 . Their method is particularly useful due to its usage of external 
information to circumvent time-restrictions and including extra information in the model, gauging 
expectations in the market, avoiding endogeneity and capturing shocks to Forward Guidance. 
4. Methodology 
The procedure used is two-phased. The first phase estimates exogenous shocks to monetary 
policy. For the sake of comparison, two series are extracted. One is similar (but slightly different) 
to  GJ and the other is the one estimated by (Gertler and Karadi 2015) (GK). Finally, both series 
will be taken as exogenous variables in the VARX framework proposed by (Gospodinov and Jamali 
2015). Since the first step is only the measurement procedure for one of the variables in the VARX 
(the exogenous one), it was found more appropriate to first outlay the latter, whereas the initial 
phase will be explained in the “Data” section. 
4.1. VARX  
We follow a Vector Autoregressive approach with an exogenous (more specifically a 
VARX(p,q))  variable as follows: 






+ 𝑢𝑡 (2) 
 
Where 𝑀𝑃𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡 are the sets of exogenous and endogenous variable sets respectively. The 
latter includes excess returns and volatility measure as well as possible transmission mechanisms, 
more specifically the Leverage, Volatility Risk Premium, Dividend Yield, Volume and Discount 
Rates used by GJ. The former will include one exogenous policy shock estimator. We will then 
compare an adapted version of the one used by GJ and by GK. Further explanations of the variables 




This subsection is divided into two parts. The first one outlays a brief description of the 
endogenous dataset. Since their calculation follows GJ, we will not present too much detail. Indeed, 
the data was taken from different sources as GJ. Instead of using Yahoo! Finance and the CME 
group, the data is extracted from a Bloomberg terminal and the FRED database. This may cause 
discrepancies from GJ, especially regarding data related to futures.  
The second part will carefully explain the two approaches used to calculate the monetary 
policy series. The methods are based off GJ and GK. Finally, the sample is constrained to the data 
available. Since the HFI data provided for GK only covers the time span between 1991m1 and 
2012m6, the data was collected for this period. 
4.2.1 Endogenous Variables 
The endogenous variables present in the model are monthly proxies for excess returns and 
volatility as well as the possible channels. Following GJ the channels will be the Dividend, 
Leverage, Volatility Feedback, Discount rate and Volume. 
The excess returns are the monthly log returns on the S&P500, subtracted by the three-
month T-bill. Volatility is proxied by the month’s realized volatility as in Bandi and Perron (2006). 
The Volatility Feedback is measured using Volatility Risk Premium, as measured by the difference 
between the risk neutral and physical volatility, that is, the difference between the VIX index and 
realized volatility. The Dividend Yield is the 12-month average dividend yield on the S&P500. The 
discount rate is proxied by two variables: the real interest rate which is the three-month T-bill minus 
the inflation (as measured by the CPI) and the difference of the T-bill also uses the previous T-bill. 
The leverage proxy is the growth rate on the Commercial and Industrial Loans, All Commercial 
Banks series from FRED and Volume is the unexpected trading volume on S&P 500 futures, 
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proxied by the residuals of an AR(10).8 
4.2.2. Exogenous variables – Monetary Policy Shock 
Monthly Future Based Measure (FEDS) 
The 30-day federal funds futures are traded securities that derive their value from the 
average FFR at the maturity month9. Their high responsiveness to monetary policy has made this 
type of assets particular useful to gauge market expectations (e.g. (Kuttner 2001)). The construction 
used by GJ uses these assets to measure the market consensus about the average FFR during any 
given month. They do so by using the implied federal funds future rate (FFFR) at the last trading 
day of the previous month’s one-month ahead FFF. Having a measure of these expectations, the 
following step is the comparison between them and the actual average FFR, more specifically the 
discontinued average federal funds rate target (FFTR). 
To extend the sample size, we have opted to use the average effective federal funds rate 
(EFFR). Indeed, this change will certainly increase endogeneity in the model. Furthermore, and as 
noted by Kuttner (2001), at a daily level the series might have significant differences from one 
another, but those are practically inexistent at a monthly level. The series is therefore:  
 𝜀𝑡
?̂? = 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡−1




 is the monetary policy shock of month t, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡−1
1  is the closing one-month ahead 
FFFR from the previous month (t-1) and 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑡 is the average effective FFR at month t. 
  Instrumental VAR with HFI (HFI) 
Gertler and Karadi (2015) take the following structural VAR model: 
                                                          
8 Please consult appendix 1 for the variable’s first two centered moments and first-order autocorrelation 
9 More specifically 𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 100 − 𝑟 , where r is the average of the FFR at the expiration month 






Where 𝑋𝑡 is a vector with all the variables at time and 𝜀𝑡 a vector of all the structural shocks. 
Let us set 𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝜖 𝑋𝑡 the policy indicator with an associated structural shock 𝜀𝑡
𝑝
 and 𝐷−1 = 𝑆. 
Multiplying both sides by S will yield the reduce form VAR:  





Where 𝑒𝑡 = 𝑆𝜀𝑡, 𝐵𝑗 = 𝑆𝐶𝑗  and 𝐸[𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑡′] = 𝐸[𝑆𝑆′] = Σ, where Σ is the variance covariance 
matrix. 
Since we only want the elements of the column of S associated with the shock, 𝜀𝑡
𝑝
 needs to 
be estimated. Let us name it s. Thus, the estimated model will be: 





The next step is to impose restrictions to the model. As previously stated, when using 
financial variables, recursive restrictions are not possible. This procedure circumvents this problem 
by assuming that the instrumental set 𝑍𝑡 is correlated to 𝜀𝑡
𝑝
 but uncorrelated to 𝜀𝑡
𝑞
, for any 𝑝 ≠ 𝑞. 
This is the same to say that the future data collected after the FOMC announcement is only reacting 
to the monetary event, which is plausible. 
After imposing these restrictions, it follows a two-stage regression. Similar do the 2SLS, 
the first step regresses the residuals of the policy indicator on the instrumental set: 
 𝑒𝑡
𝑝 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑍𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 (7) 
 
This step isolates the variation on 𝑒𝑡
𝑝
 exclusively associated to 𝜀𝑡
𝑝. Hence the fitted value 
𝑒𝑡
?̂?









So, the following step is the estimate 𝑠𝑡
𝑝
. This can be done by using the Σ matrix and the 






?̂? + 𝜉𝑡 (9) 
Having 𝑠𝑝 estimated, 𝜀𝑡
?̂?
 can be promptly extracted from 𝑒𝑡
?̂?
 
Finally, the variables present in 𝑋𝑡 are the one-year government bond rate (as the policy 
indicator), the log consumer price index, the log industrial production, the mortgage spread, the 
commercial paper spread and the excess bond premium as measured by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek 
(2012). The instrumental variable 𝑍𝑡 uses the 30 minutes high frequency set of the three-month 
ahead FFFR. By using both a policy indicator and instrumental variables with longer maturity, this 
method is able to capture shocks to Forward Guidance. 
5. Results 
5.1 Comparing both MP series 
With a 0.57 correlation coefficient, both series are substantially different and have 
distinguishable traits. For starters, both the mean and standard deviation are clearly different. Even 
though the HFI is more volatile, having a standard deviation of 0.31 as opposed to 0.20, both HFI 
and FEDS processes produce on average negative shocks, although the latter having on average 
more negative results (-0.03 as opposed to -0.01 p.p.). The higher volatility should reflect the wider 
level of expectations captured by the HFI, whereas the more negative mean in the FEDS series may 
be caused by some possible reaction to economic downturns by the Fed that is not correctly 
measured by the FEDS series. 
                                                          
10 The authors suggest consulting the original paper for a full derivation 
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Looking at both series’ plots, it not only appears that HFI is more volatile, but also that the 
shocks usually have a greater scale. It is also interesting to notice the changes before and after the 
great recession. If prior to the financial crisis the correlation coefficient was 0.63, afterwards it 
decreased to a mere 0.41. This may come as no surprise since prior to the zero lower bound, the 
Fed was able to use both the short-term interest rate and communication to affect the markets 
whereas afterwards it was mainly capable to use communication. As the FEDS series only capture 
conventional mechanisms and HFI captures both, it is natural by construction that the correlation 
coefficient decreases, and that the FEDS series measures a smaller portion of the shock 
Furthermore, the HFI is consistently above zero (after 2008), whereas FEDS is virtually 
zero. This confirms the predictions made by GJ that the market participants were able to better 
assess the next month’s EFFR, hardly being surprised by actions made by the Fed. However, the 
positive values of the HFI series also hints that by considering unconventional MP, the Fed is still 




5.2. Dynamic Multiplier Analysis 
The next step is to analyze the responsiveness of the endogenous variables to a shock on 
the exogenous variables. This shock is a 10-basis points surprise hike and the confidence bands are 
at a 95% percent level. The impulse response plots can be consulted in the Appendix: Appendix 2 
and 3 measure the reaction to the shock on the pre-crisis sample (1991m1-2007m12) for the FEDS 
and HFI series respectively whereas Appendix 4 and 5 graph the reaction for the full sample 
(1991m1-2012m6). 
5.2.1 Pre-Crisis Sample 
Even if the response to a shock of the FEDS series appears to be of higher magnitude, the 
results are remarkably similar at a pre-financial crisis level. As expected, excess returns decrease 
contemporaneously with an interest rate hike. However, in both series there are positive excess 
returns on the following month, which dissipate after that. Volatility does not appear to respond to 
the hike with either shock series, which contradicts the hypothesis postulated by this paper. The 
Dividend Yield is also clearly positive affected by the shock using both series, dying out at around 
three months after the shock. Leverage also increases even if it is only significant some months 
after the shock (3 months in the FEDS and 7 with the HFI series). The main difference arises when 
measuring the Volatility Risk Premium, that only increases (contemporaneously) using the HFI 
shock. The two proxies considered as the Discount Rate mechanism, present different results from 
one another. The 3-month T-bill, has a higher contemporaneous increase whereas the Real Interest 
Rate is not significant. Finally, unexpected Volume does not appear to be a significant transmission 
mechanism. 
5.2.2. Full Sample 
When the full sample is used, huge changes appear between both series. Excess returns 
continue to react negatively when using HFI, but this well-documented result does not exist when 
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using FEDS as it ceases to be statistically significant. Furthermore, volatility is significant in both 
scenarios but with different signs. As expected, volatility increases when using the HFI series but 
decreases when using the FEDS series. Furthermore, the Dividend Yield turns insignificant when 
using the latter series whereas the impact appears to be stronger as in the previous sample with the 
HFI. Interestingly, the Volatility Risk Premium is not statistically significant in either series 
whereas the Leverage variable continues to be significant in both (at a 3-month horizon). Another 
puzzling result using the FEDS series is related with the Real Interest Rate series, that reacts 
negatively with a policy tightening. Using the HFI series, the non-significant results are maintained. 
The 3-month T-bill and the Volume variables present similar responses as in the previous sample. 
5.3. Discussion 
GJ predict that all channels (Leverage, Dividend, Discount Rate, Volatility Feedback and 
Volume) contribute to the increase in market volatility. Our results are slightly different: In a pre-
crisis sample level, there is no effect on volatility. When the channels are considered, only the 
Dividend Yield and the Volatility Feedback appear to have similar results. The Discount 
mechanism can also be considered partially important, as only the 3-month T-bill increases. Finally, 
one can also argue that the Leverage mechanism contributes, but it is only significative 7 months 
after the shock. Considering all the observations, volatility is positively affected one month after 
the shock. But in this case, the Volatility Feedback ceases to be a significant mechanism. The other 
variables exhibit similar results.  
In this period, there is a decrease on contemporaneous excess returns which is consistent 
with the literature. However, volatility is not affected at a monthly level, differing from the results 
obtained by GJ11.  First and foremost, due to the decrease in stock prices, the Dividend channel 
                                                          
11 This can be a consequence of the different sources from which the data was obtained, and the change of the MPS 
series as previously explained. For what is the author’s understanding, it appears that the data on futures taken 
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appears to have the most persistent effect, as in GJ. This reaction may be cause by the unwillingness 
for firms to diminish dividend payout to avoid sending bad signs to the market or losing potential 
clientele. Discount Rates also increase contemporaneously, which makes them into another 
possible explanation. However, and has noted by Bernanke and Kuttner (2004), the real interest 
rate does not react significantly. The Leverage Effect also appears to be present, but only a couple 
of months into the future, which may deem it irrelevant. Finally, the Feedback Hypothesis as 
measured by the Volatility Risk Premium only appears to be relevant when using HFI as an 
indicator. The News Channel as measured by the unexpected volume of the S&P futures, is not 
significant in any of the series. 
When it comes to the full-sample however, everything changes. First, the well-documented 
in literature decrease on excess returns disappears when using the FEDS series, while the 
contemporaneous volatility responds by decreasing. When using the HFI series, the former variable 
maintains the current decaying behavior whereas the volatility even increases a month into the 
future. This may be a result of disregarding both shocks to Forward Guidance and the reaction 
component. The two months following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September of 2008 
registered the peak of volatility in sample (79.24 and 69.41 for October and November 
respectively). During that time, the monetary shock as measured by the FEDS has also had two of 
its biggest decreases (-0.84 and -0.58 percent). If the latter shock captures macroeconomic 
phenomena (such as some sort of flight to safety) or a reaction of monetary policy, it is highly 
likely that the results to be spurious. When using the HFI series, the shocks are considerably 
different with 0.37 and -0.23 percent for October and November respectively. Furthermore, and as 
presented previously, the latter years of the sample show a consistent gap between the HFI and the 
                                                          
from Bloomberg may not be as reliable as the one purchased from the CME group itself. The usage of the EFFR as 
opposed to the Target Rate may also increase endogeneity 
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FEDS. If this gap is containing shocks to Forward Guidance, the FEDS series is not able to capture 
it and thus not noting an effect that might be happening. 
Finally, the transmission channels hinted by both series are also different. For the FEDS, 
the only two that remain significant are the Leverage Effect and the discount channel. Interestingly, 
there is a contemporaneous decrease in the real interest rate followed by an increase on the 3rd 
month after the shock. Except for the Feedback Channel, when using the HFI series, the results are 
robust for the other transmission channels. 
6. Conclusion 
By using the most recent developments on MP identification, this paper has shown that 
monetary agents still have the ability to influence market volatility of equity returns at a monthly 
level, through the Leverage, Discount Rate and (essentially) the Dividend Yield. Contrary to GJ, 
there is no evidence for any impact prior to the financial crisis. 
It has also exposed limitations of traditional monetary policy shocks measurements, which 
may provide considerably different results. More specifically, the inability to capture shocks to 
Forward Guidance and possible endogeneity issues may seriously skew the results. For instance, 
volatility responded negatively when using the FEDS series, whereas positively with a hike on HFI. 
The channels were also different, with the Leverage and Discount Rates being the ones present in 
the former whereas the Dividend Yield, Leverage and Discount channels are identified in the latter. 
But when considering a pre-financial crisis world, the results using both series are remarkably 
similar, with neither being able to find a link between volatility and monetary policy. 
However, even if it can link monetary policy and volatility, the method used is incapable of 
directly linking the previous channels to the increase of volatility. It only measures if MP affect the 
specific transmission variables and relies on the literature to assume that they could translate into 
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Variable Mean Std. Deviation Autocorrelation 
 
A:1991m1:2007m12 
   
Excess Returns on the S&P500 (ER) 0.40 3.87 -0.06 
Realized Volatility of S&P 500 (VOL) 13.92 6.52 0.71 
Volatility Risk Premium (VRP) 4.78 3.40 0.13 
Real Interest Rate (RINT) 1.32 2.91 0.41 
Change in 3-month T-bill Rate (DTB) -0.02 0.21 0.43 
Dividend Yield on the S&P500 (DY) 1.96 0.62 0.98 
Unexpected change in S&P500 futures trading volume 
(VOLUME) 
1.27 15.54 -0.00 
Commercial and industrial loan Growth (LEV) 0.39 0.82 0.71 
Monetary Policy Shock - FEDS -0.02 0.19 0.59 
Monetary Policy Shock - HFI -0.02 0.33 0.32 
 
B:1991m1:2012m6 
   
Excess Returns on the S&P500 (ER) 0.28 4.37 0.06 
Realized Volatility of S&P 500 (VOL) 15.72 9.55 0.77 
Volatility Risk Premium (VRP) 4.65 4.56 0.24 
Real Interest Rate (RINT) 0.76 3.56 0.52 
Change in 3-month T-bill Rate (DTB) -0.03 0.21 0.44 
Dividend Yield on the S&P500 (DY) 2.03 0.61 0.98 
Unexpected change in S&P500 futures trading volume 
(VOLUME) 
-0.01 18.10 0.00 
Commercial and industrial loan Growth (LEV) 0.30 0.95 0.74 
Monetary Policy Shock - FEDS -0.03 0.19 0.61 
Monetary Policy Shock - HFI -0.01 0.31 0.30 
    


















Appendix 5 - Response to a 10-bps hike as measured by the HFI. 1991m1-2012m6 
